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ABSTRACT 
The proliferation of nuclear weapons poses a serious 
threat to the United States, its allies, and over-all world 
security. The United States seeks to dissuade or prevent 
new countries from acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities. 
This thesis constructs two models to aid decision makers in 
selecting strategies to interdict these proliferation 
efforts. The first, a "what-if" PERT/CPM model, provides an 
overall picture of the proliferation process. The graphical 
display is used to select activities to interdict, and to 
analyze the outcome of the choices. The second, an optimal 
interdiction model, selects the optimal activity ( ies) for 
interdiction subject to risk constraints. Several runs with 
different numbers of interdiction points were made to test 
the optimal interdiction model. These results are further 
analyzed with the aid of the PERT /CPM model. The models, 
when used together, prove to be useful in selecting the 
optimal activities to interdict in the proliferation 
process. 
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The views expressed in this thesis are those of the 
author and do not reflect the official policy or position of 
the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The proliferation of nuclear weapons poses a serious 
threat to the United States, its allies, and over-all world 
security. The United States seeks to dissuade or prevent 
new countries from acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities. 
If political or economic measures prove ineffective in 
discouraging or blocking a proliferator, military action may 
become necessary. 
To support a strategy of delaying or preventing the 
development of nuclear weapons, this thesis develops two 
decision aids or tools for estimating the delay caused by 
certain actions, possibly military. The decision aids can 
be used by decision makers in the selection of a specific 
course of action to hinder the weapons program. 
The two approaches to aid the decision maker in the 
development of an interdiction strategy are a "what-if" 
PERT/CPM model and an optimal interdiction model. The basis 
of both approaches is the PERT/CPM (Program Evaluation and 
Review Technique/Critical Path Method) methodology. Both 
decision aids involve the selection of points for 
interdicting the nuclear weapons program of a proliferating 
country. The "what-if" PERT/CPM model implementation allows 
the user to manually select the activity for interdiction. 
The user can then graphically interpret the effects, 
including delay in project completion and the associated 
cost, social and economic impact, possible retaliatory 
response, and the required effort of the interdictor. This 
model is implemented in the commercially available software 
package MacProject Pro. 
In the optimal interdiction model, the set of 
interdiction activities is selected to maximize the induced 
vii 
delay in completing the project. An extension of this model 
allows the user to include constraints that limit the cost 
and impacts of the interdiction effort to be under specified 
levels. Both the model and its extension are implemented in 
GAMS. Illustrations using data based on two types of 
nuclear weapons programs demonstrate that the model provide 
useful information for decision making. 
Several runs of the optimal interdiction model, with 
two different data sets, were made to test the effectiveness 
of from one through three activity interdiction strategies. 
The results obtained show that the optimal interdiction 
activities can be solved with an operations research 
approach. In a few of the multiple activity interdiction 
runs the activities selected for interdiction were not on 
the original critical path, and thus an interdiction induces 
both a delay and a new critical path. These results show 
the critical path may not be best source of activities to 
interdict. 
To summarize, this thesis demonstrates that developing 
a strategy for the control of the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons can be aided by two decision tools: an optimal 
interdiction model and a "what-if" PERT/CPM model. These 
models have their respective strengths and weaknesses. 
Developing a good interdiction strategy depends on the 
subjective judgment of experts that may be difficult to 
capture in an optimization model, and we do not advocate the 
use of the optimal interdiction model as a stand-alone 
decision aid. Nevertheless, the analysis we have shown here 
indicates that the optimal interdiction model can provide 
non-trivial insights to interdiction strategies under the 
chosen constraints. 
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I . INTRODUCTION 
Chapter I provides a background of the issues currently 
surrounding the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Section A 
presents a history from the beginning of the nuclear age 
through China's acquisition of a nuclear weapon in 1964. 
Second-generation proliferators, those who have nuclear 
weapons and those who want nuclear weapons, are discussed in 
Section B. The present nonproliferation regime is described 
in Section C. Current U.S. policy and a discussion of 
counterproliferation issues are covered in Section D. 
Readers knowledgeable in the proliferation area could 
proceed directly to Chapter II. 
A. BACKGROUND 
1. Beginnings of Proliferation 
Since the 1930's certain countries throughout the world 
have sought to possess nuclear weapons. Two of the more 
advanced nations in the search for military uses of atomic 
power at that time were the Germans and the Italians. After 
Hitler and Mussolini came to power, fears of the future of 
nuclear power and difficult conditions for scientists in 
these nations lead many eminent nuclear physicists to 
emigrate to the United States. These events spurred 
President Roosevelt to begin the U.S. nuclear weapons 
program, the Manhattan Project, in 1941. [Ref. 1] 
The events of World War II slowed and eventually halted 
the nuclear weapons aspirations of both Germany and Italy. 
During the war, the United States undertook top-secret 
efforts to acquire information, personnel and hardware 
relating to the German atomic program; the project was 
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code-named "ALSOS." In April 1945, American forces captured 
a number of nuclear facilities and atomic scientists, 
including Werner Heisenberg, Kurt Diebner, and Otto Hahn, 
the discoverer of atomic fission. [Ref. 1, p.24] Though the 
United States acquired a great deal of useful information, 
the Soviet Union also gained much information and materials 
on their march from the east. The United States was able to 
use the information to achieve its nuclear ambition as early 
as 1945. The United States demonstrated its abilities twice 
during August of that year at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
The Soviet Union was next to achieve status as a member 
of the nuclear weapons club. With all the knowledge, 
facilities and materials gained by the takeover of the 
German effort, the Soviets were able to detonate a nuclear 
device on August 29, 1949. This represented the beginning 
of the nuclear standoff between the world's two superpowers. 
[Ref. 2] 
The next member of the prestigious club was Great 
Britain. It began a nuclear program before the United 
States in 1939. The United States asked to join in the 
British effort in late 1940, but was rebuffed, with the 
British agreeing only to technology exchange. By 1943, with 
the war depleting required resources, the roles were 
reversed and Great Britain asked for U.S. assistance. The 
United States allowed both Great Britain and Canada to 
participate with the Manhattan Project. Following the war 
the British hoped to continue to work with the United 
States, but the McMahon Act(1946) prohibited collaboration 
on nuclear weapons matters with any foreign power. The 
Soviet detonation of an atomic bomb in 1949 resulted in an 
amendment to the McMahon Act in 1950 to allow greater U.S. 
support of the British effort. By October 1952, with 
2 
Winston Churchill back in office, Great Britain detonated 
its first nuclear weapon. [Ref. 2] 
France was the next and most recent western nation to 
join the club. Though a sophisticated French nuclear 
scientific program, lead by Joliot-Curie, was begun in the 
early 1930's, World War II put an end to their effort. The 
post Second World War push consisted mainly of basic 
research and commercial nuclear power development. In 1954 
the French decided the production of a nuclear weapon was 
politically feasible and in December 1956 began a program. 
By 1958 France had developed its own nuclear weapons and 
delivery systems and began to build its own nuclear triad, 
of missiles, submarines and bombers. [Ref. 2] 
The last declared nuclear power is the People's 
Republic of China. Its program began in 1954 despite Mao 
Zedong' s disparaging remarks about the bomb. The program 
progressed well under the tutelage of Soviet scientists, 
engineers and technicians until 1959, when China became 
angered at not receiving open access to Soviet knowledge. 
By 1960, the Soviets pulled its scientists out of China and 
refused all technical assistance. These events led to a 
rift in Sino-Soviet relations. The detonation of a device 
in October 1964 led to China's nuclear independence. 
China's weapons are of little strategic concern to the 
United States due to limited numbers and range. An area of 
concern to the United States is the assistance China 
provides to proliferating states in terms of technology, 
materials and equipment. [Ref. 3] 
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B. CURRENT PROLIFERATION EFFORTS 
In addition to the five declared nuclear weapons states 
there are three types of proliferators in the world today. 
The first are the "De facto Nuclear Weapon States". This 
status is given to those countries believed to possess 
nuclear weapons or the ability to construct weapons in a 
short period of time. The "De facto Nuclear Weapons States" 
will be covered in section 1. The second proliferation 
concern is with respect to the Soviet break-up. How each of 
the now independent states, many with control of former 
Soviet nuclear facilities, will react on the issue of 
proliferation is unknown. The issues concerning these 
"Undecided Nuclear Inheritors" are covered in section 2. 
The last and greatest concern are the "Aspiring Nuclear 
Weapon States". These are nations building weapons to gain 
supremacy over their own region and possibly foster global 
intentions. The "Aspiring Nuclear Weapon States" are 
discussed in section 3. A world map with the current 
proliferation concerns is shown in Figure 1. 
1. De Facto Nuclear Weapon States 
Several countries in the past two decades have joined 
the nuclear family, either overtly or covertly. India, was 
the first when it detonated a "peaceful" nuclear device in 
1974. India is known to stockpile nuclear weapons material 
but has made no overt effort to actually maintain weapons. 
[Ref. 2] 
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vacillated as to whether to believe or publicly confirm 
these suppositions. Pakistan is not an NPT member and does 
not permit IAEA inspections. [Ref. 4] 
A third "De facto Nuclear Weapon State" with possible 
nuclear capability and the means to employ it at short 
notice is Israel. The Israelis are believed to have a 
clandestine arsenal of about 100 weapons. With a completely 
in-house effort of technology and materials, verifying the 
presence of nuclear weapons is difficult. 
South Africa is the last of the "De facto Nuclear 
Weapon States". The South African government admitted to 
constructing six nuclear weapons. Subsequently, it has 
disassembled its nuclear arsenal. South Africa signed the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1991 and has opened its 
facilities to nuclear inspections. The combination of a 
change in leadership and a strong technology base makes the 
future of South Africa's nuclear effort or "non-effort" 
unclear. [Ref. 4,p. 6] 
Though the use of a weapon by a "De facto Nuclear 
Weapon State is remote, the fact these nations possess the 
capability is a concern. Regional instabilities could lead 
one of these nations to the brink of nuclear conflict. The 
situation in the Middle East does cause some concern. 
Israel could retaliate with a nuclear strike if they are 
attacked with chemical or biological weapons by a neighbor; 
however, current peace efforts in the region are making this 
possibility more remote. 
2. Soviet Break-up 
With the downfall of Communism and the breakup of the 
Soviet Union into individual states, a new risk in nuclear 
proliferation has developed. The first area of concern is 
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the emergence of three nuclear inheritors: Belarus, 
Kazakhstan and the Ukraine. These nations possess nuclear 
weapons that were once the property of the Soviet Union. 
The instability of these new governments leads to great 
uncertainty with respect to their future proliferation 
policies. 
Another and more immediate problem is the leakage of 
nuclear technology, equipment, materials and experts. 
Transfer of nuclear products can occur by way of overt, 
over-the-counter sales, clandestine assistance to a 
proliferating country, or unauthorized leakage. 
The final and more lasting concern is the unknown 
stance on the proliferation policy of the non-nuclear Soviet 
states. Many possess a great deal of materials, equipment 
and technology that went into building the U.S.S.R.'s large 
nuclear arsenal. The leadership in these newly born 
democracies could elect to pursue nuclear weapons and lead 
to a future world with many more nuclear states. 
3. Aspiring Nuclear Weapon States 
While the current proliferators cause concern to the 
world community, the "Aspiring Nuclear Weapon States" could 
pose a bigger problem. A major effort is currently being 
pursued by the Republic of North Korea. Because of its past 
effort, Iraq must be included in this category. Other less 
advanced countries include Iran, Libya and Algeria. These 
three countries are of less concern. While Libya and 
Algeria have research reactors, none have operational power 
reactors. None possess enough fissile material or the 
technology to assemble a nuclear weapon. However, they all 
possess delivery systems capable of a ranges over lOOkm. 
[Ref. 4] Thus, the largest immediate concern for these 
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cases is the covert purchase of an operational weapon from a 
nuclear state (e.g., former Soviet states) 
At one time, Iraq was a thorn in the side of the 
non-proliferation effort. It initially followed a path to 
producing a plutonium-based nuclear weapon. This effort was 
halted by the Israeli bombing of Iraq's non-operational 
reactor at Osirak in June 1981. Iraq then turned in a 
different direction in order to build a bomb - the enriched 
uranium cycle. Iraq spent billions of dollars and 
commissioned thousands of people to the project, code named 
Petrochemical-3. This effort was aided by the West's 
support of Iraq during the Iran- Iraq War. Though Iraq 
remained a member of the NPT, the Western nations neglected 
to enforce the NPT and allowed them to import nuclear 
technologies. [Ref. 5] 
The onset of The Persian Gulf War in 1991 resulted in a 
dramatic setback of Iraq's nuclear program. Many of the 
primary targets for the allies were known or suspected 
nuclear facilities. With the Iraqi defeat, United Nations 
Resolution 687 enforced heavy inspection criteria on the 
Iraqi nuclear program. Though a great deal of technology 
and equipment was destroyed, many facilities went untouched 
during the bombing campaign. With the completion of current 
mandated inspections, there is no sure sign that the Iraqi 
nuclear program has ceased to exist. 
The final source of proliferation concern is the 
Republic of North Korea. While North Korea is currently a 
member of the NPT, its commitment to the treaty is, at best, 
suspect and they have vacillated on the issue of withdrawing 
from the NPT. After years of delaying nuclear inspections 
(1985-92), it finally allowed limited inspections. In March 
1993 North Korea denied any further IAEA access and 
8 
announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT 
permitted under the terms of the treaty). 
(which is 
Upon U.S. 
diplomatic intervention in June, North Korea postponed its 
withdrawal. 
The world community has made numerous attempts, using 
various approaches, to prevent nuclear proliferation in 
North Korea. Political progress toward reconciliation of 
the hostilities between North and South, led to the signing 
of a "Joint Declaration for a Non-Nuclear Korean Peninsula" 
in 1991. North Korea's agreement to IAEA inspections was 
given and subsequently rescinded several times over the past 
two years. The most recent nonproliferation effort was the 
threat of economic sanctions from the United Nations. While 
the threat of such sanctions are the most severe effort to 
date, in order to prevent or deter proliferation, there is 
the distinct possibility that the use of sanctions could 
lead to the requirement for military actions on the Korean 
Peninsula. With the recent passing of Kim Il Sung, future 
proliferation on the Korean peninsula is uncertain. [Ref. 4] 
C. TREATIES AND CONTROLS 
The nuclear nonproliferation regime, to include the use 
of international treaties, institutions and bilateral 
nuclear-trade agreements, has proven to be a major deterrent 
to the spread of nuclear weapons. A principal portion of 
this regime is the International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA). 
The IAEA is a Vienna-based organization directly affiliated 
with the United Nations. The agency was founded in 1957 and 
currently has 110 signed members. The IAEA's primary 
function is the implementation of a program of on-site 
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inspections, audits, and inventory controls. This program 
is generally referred to as IAEA safeguards. [Ref. l, p.336] 
The purpose of these safeguards is to prevent the 
diversion of peacefully obtained nuclear materials to 
military purposes. The safeguards are based on the timely 
detection and notification of any abnormalities. When 
inspectors are not on-site, container seals and cameras are 
used to detect diversions. In the event of a safeguards 
violation the IAEA has the authority to notify the United 
Nations Security Council, but cannot impose sanctions. 
[Ref. 1] 
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) represents 
the next step in the creation of the nonproliferation 
regime. The treaty, which went into effect on March 5, 1970 
for 25 years, divides the countries that signed it into two 
categories: Nuclear Weapon States (the United States, the 
Soviet Union, Great Britain, France and China) and 
Non-Nuclear States (other member countries) . The NPT 
prohibits all members, except the five Nuclear Weapon 
States, from acquiring nuclear weapons. It requires all 
non-nuclear members to implement a safeguards agreement with 
the IAEA, covering all nuclear materials that could be used 
in weapons programs. A conference in 1995 is set to discuss 
an extension of the treaty. [Ref. 4] 
Two smaller treaties have also been instrumental in the 
nonproliferation regime. The Treaty of Tlatelolco (1968), 
created a Latin American nuclear-weapons free zone. The 
parties agreed not to manufacture, test, acquire weapons or 
allow others to place them on their terri tory. The Treaty 
of Raratonga (1986) created a South Pacific nuclear-weapons 
free zone based on the same principles as Latin America. 
[Ref. 4] 
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A Nuclear Suppliers Group also plays an important part 
of the nonproliferation regime. The group is based on the 
Non-proliferation Treaty Exporters Committee (Zangger 
Committee) which established IAEA safeguards and a "trigger 
list" for nuclear materials and equipment that is exported. 
The major provisions of the agreement require that before 
nuclear material, equipment or technology can be 
transferred, the receiving country must: 
1. Pledge not to use the transferred materials to 
produce nuclear weapons. 
2. Accept international safeguards on all transferred 
materials. 
3. Provide security for materials to prevent theft or 
sabotage. 
4. Agree not to transfer materials to a third party. 
These provisions are currently being adhered to by the 
following nations: the United States, Great Britain, France, 
Germany, Japan, Canada, all former Soviet States, Belgium, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, 
Poland, Australia, and Finland. [Ref. 1, pp. 348-352] 
D. UNITED STATES NONPROLIFERATION POLICY STATEMENT 
1. Enhanced Nonproliferation Efforts 
The most recent example of U.S. policy on non-
proliferation is described by a release from the Office of 
the Press Secretary to the President dated September 27, 
1993. The fact sheet discussed the policy of non-
proliferation and export controls. 
The President established a framework for U.S. efforts 
to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
and the missiles that deliver them. He outlined three major 
11 
principles to guide the nonproliferation and export control 
policy: 
1. Our national security requires us to accord higher 
priority to nonproliferation, to make it an integral element 
of our relations with other countries. 
2. To strengthen U.S. economic growth, democratization 
abroad and international stability, we actively seek 
expanded trade and technology exchange with nations, 
including former adversaries, that abide by global 
nonproliferation norms. 
3. We need to build a new consensus -- embracing the 
Executive and Legislative branches, industry and public, and 
friends abroad to promote effective nonproliferation 
efforts and integrate our nonproliferation and economic 
goals. 
The president reaffirmed U.S. 







multilateral support and employs all means at our disposal 
to advance our objectives. 
Key elements of the policy follow: 
1. Comprehensive approach to control the 
accumulation of fissile material from 
weapons and within civil nuclear programs. 
growing 
nuclear 
2. Uniform use of export controls applied by all 
suppliers. 
3. The United States will make every effort to secure 
the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 and 
ensure that the IAEA has the resources needed to 
implement its vital safeguard responsibilities, and 
will work to strengthen the IAEA's ability to 
detect clandestine nuclear activities. 







a higher profile 
and analysis and 
in our 
defense 
planning, and ensure that our own force structure 
and military planning address the potential threat 
from weapons of mass destruction and missiles 
around the world. 
2. Counterproliferation 
The nonproliferation regime is designed to dissuade 
non-nuclear states from starting nuclear weapons programs. 
When nonproliferation efforts fail to prevent the spread of 
nuclear weapons, counterproliferation may be required. The 
difference between the two efforts is that nonproliferation 
tries to prevent nations from seeking nuclear weapons and 
counterproliferation attempts to stop those who have started 
from attaining nuclear weapons, or those who have weapons to 
give them up. While there is not a universal definition of 
counterproliferation, it is generally regarded as the 
response to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
and their means of delivery, at any state of development by 
means ranging from diplomacy to military interdiction. 
Counterproliferation is a potentially important instrument 
but is limited by international norms. It could be used to 
strengthen the current nonproliferation policies and 
regimes, but is not considered a substitute. Direct 
military intervention is generally regarded as a last resort 
because of the costs, operational difficulties and possible 
consequences. Three areas generally accepted as part of 
counterproliferation are diplomatic/political pressure, 
economic sanctions, and military means. The basis for these 
approaches will be discussed in the following sections. 
a. Diplomatic/Political Pressures 
The use of diplomatic pressure in an attempt to 
prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons comes in a variety 
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of methods. The first is the direct diplomatic intervention 
toward the proliferator. Efforts to convince a country not 
to seek a weapon can be positive or negative in nature. The 
negative points are sometimes a greater concern to the 
proliferator, and often harder to bring about by the 
diplomat. Some of the issues presented to the potential 
proliferator are as follows: 
1. Acceptance in or becoming an outcast of the New 
World order. 
2. Increased opportunity to participate in world 
activities. 
3. Increased security through concessions or military 
aid, or destabilization in the region. 
4. Economic incentives or sanctions and embargoes 
depending on the level of cooperation. 
5. Possible military intervention. 
The second form of diplomatic pressure an indirect 
one and it is applied to countries aiding the proliferator. 
In this case, pressure is directed toward stopping those 
countries from supplying proliferation materials activities. 
The pressure applied can range from diplomatic discussions, 
to export controls, to the embargo of outgoing material. 
Lastly, stabilization within the region can also 
prevent proliferation through diplomatic means. Formal 
discussions with adversaries of the proliferator can help 
reduce tensions and, in turn, prevent the perceived need for 
nuclear weapons. Such efforts have proven successful in the 
case of Brazil and Argentina. The use of diplomatic 
discussions brought both these countries back from the edge 
of proliferation. [Ref. 4] 
b. Economic Sanctions 
When diploma tic efforts fai 1, economic sanctions 
usually represent the next level of counterproliferation 
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measures. These sanctions can be applied to either the 
proliferator or their supplying companies or countries. If 
applied to the supplier, the purpose of the sanctions are as 
a deterrent, not a punishment. U.S. laws and regulations 
provide for both criminal penalties and government 
procurement embargoes against U.S. and foreign companies in 
·violation of U.S. export regulations. In some cases, the 
laws provide for aid or trade sanctions against countries 
that supply a means of proliferation to other countries. 
Some of these penalties include: 
1. Cut-off of economic and military aid. 
2. Forfeiture of property and assets. 
3. Denial of arms transfers from the United States. 
4. Blocking of international financial transactions. 
5. Denial of assistance from international 
organizations in which the U.S. participates. 
U.S. Law currently stresses the use of economic 
sanctions, over other types, toward a potential 
proliferator. The NPT practices a form of economic sanction 
by offering cooperation in civil nuclear technology exchange 
only to member nations. [Ref. 4] 
c. ~litary Intervention 
Military intervention as a means to prevent or 
reverse the efforts of the proliferating country can prove 
problematic. In January 1992, the United Nations Security 
Council declared the proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction to be a threat to international peace and 
security. This could open the door to tacit U.N. approval 
in using military efforts to deter proliferation. Even in 
cases not backed by a U.N. consensus, a military action 




There are several possible levels of military 
intervention. The first and least dangerous is the use of 
naval and air forces in a blockade to prevent the transfer 
of materials. This method proved relatively effective 
during the Persian Gulf War against Iraq in 1990-91. The 
next and possibly most volatile level of action is the 
covert use of forces against the proliferating country. 
These forces could be used to destroy technologies, 
materials equipment and possibly expertise used in the 
nuclear effort. The final method is the overt use of 
military forces against the nuclear program materials, 
equipment, and facilities of the proliferator. From a 
political standpoint it is generally necessary to build a 
consensus to justify these measures and in most cases the 
effort should remain short of all out war. [Ref. 4] 
The decision to pursue an effort of military 
interdiction requires a well-thought strategy. The current 
counterproliferation policy stresses intelligence to attain 
real time information on a prolierant' s activities. The 
decision on when to interdict and the specific activity or 
activities to interdict to achieve the maximum effect are 
paramount. This decision could be aided through the use of 
an operations analysis approach. The remainder of this 
thesis discusses, formulates and implements two models for 
use in the decision making process. 
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II PROBLEM STATEMENT 
A. DEFINITION 
The proliferation of nuclear weapons poses a serious 
threat to the United States, our allies and over-all world 
security. The United States seeks to dissuade or prevent 
the proliferation efforts of countries seeking nuclear 
capability as discussed in Chapter I, Section D. If 
political or economic measures prove ineffective in 
deterring a proliferator, military action may become 
necessary. 
To focus on a strategy of delaying or preventing the 
development of nuclear weapons, United States Strategic 
Command (STRATCOM) is interested in a decision aid or tool 
that can be used to estimate the delay caused by certain 
actions, possibly military. The decision aid could be used 
by decision makers in the selection of a course of action, 
out of the myriad of choices, to deter the proliferator. 
Any decision made could have a dramatic effect on the 
proliferator, its neighbors and the United States. 
Because the interdiction of a country's proliferation 
effort is of great magnitude, such a decision should 
encompass as much information as possible. Relevant 
information may come from a variety of sources, and include 
both general knowledge and classified information. General 
knowledge is based on area studies on the population, 
economy, social, military, and political situations. 
Classified information would come from secure sources both 
internal and international. This thesis will not include 
secure information for classification reasons. 
The development of nuclear weapons consists 
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in the effort can be achieved by interrupting one or more of 
the activities in the network. The interruption of an 
activity 
military 








military interdiction is Iraeli destruction of 
reactor at Osirak in 1981. 
effective 
the Iraqi 
The factors to be considered when determining the 
activity to be interrupted are: 
1. Additional time until completion of the weapons. 
2. Monetary cost incurred by the proliferator. 
3. Social impact on the population. 
4. Economic impact on the country or region. 
5. Possible retaliatory actions. 
6. Required effort by the interdicting nation. 
Factors 2 through 6 will be represented by ordinal data, and 
will be rated as to severity or effort. 
The problem is then to select those activities to 
interdict so as to maximize the time delay of the project, 
while satisfying certain pre-specified constraints regarding 
the above listed factors. 
B. THESIS OUTLINE 
The remainder of the thesis concentrates on the 
development and implementation of two models: a "what-if" 
PERT/CPM model and an optimal interdiction model. The 
discussion is organized as follows. 
Chapter III, section A describes the data used in both 
models, its derivation and generation. Section B contains 
methodology surrounding the development and implementation 
of the "what-if" PERT/CPM model; the PERT/CPM model also 
acts as a subproblem of the optimal interdiction model. 
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Section B also covers the application of MacProject Pro to 
solving the PERT/CPM model. Section C covers the derivation 
of the optimal interdiction model. Section D provides an 
interpretation constraint structure and implementetion of 
the optimal interdiction model in the General Algebraic 
Modeling System (GAMS) . Section E is a short discussion of 
some related work. 
Chapter IV analyzes the results from various runs of 
the optimal interdiction model and how they relate to the 
underlying PERT/CPM model. Chapter v discusses the 
conclusions drawn in the thesis and outlines some 
possibilities for follow-on research. 
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III METHODOLOGY 
Two approaches to aid the decision maker in the 
development of an interdiction strategy are considered in 
this thesis. The basis of both approaches is the PERT/CPM 
(Program Evaluation and Review Technique/Critical Path 
Method) methodology which is discussed in section B. Both 
decision aids involve the selection of activities for 
interdicting the nuclear weapons program of a proliferating 
country. The "what-if" PERT/CPM model implementation allows 
the user to manually select the activity for interdiction. 
The user can then graphically view the effects, including 
delay in project completion and the associated cost, social 
and economic impact, possible retaliatory response, and the 
required effort of the interdictor. The second decision aid 
involves the optimal selection, from a set of allowable 
activities, the activity or activities to be interdicted and 
is described in section C. A discussion of the supporting 
data, to include how it was derived and sorted, and what is 
used in the models, is covered in section A. 
A. DISCUSSION OF DATA 
The data used in the two models is primarily the same. 
In the PERT/CPM model the data is in a descriptive form, so 
the decision maker can interpret it easily. This 
descriptive data is 
optimization model. 
following sections. 
translated into a nominal scale for 
Data generation is covered in the 
1. Past Proliferation Efforts 
In order to keep the thesis unclassified, data from 
current proliferation efforts could not be used. Instead 
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published reports and IAEA inspection records were used as a 
basis for the data collected. Some raw data was subjective 
in nature and required interpretation. 
To obtain a realistic data set for illustration, the 
proliferation efforts of recently completed nuclear programs 
are included. The data is based on studies of the 
proliferator' s facilities and equipment. The locations of 
the facilities, surrounding population, and political 
situation all help to determine the resulting data set. 
The construction of a nuclear weapon is a complex 
series of steps that begins with the purchase or mining of 
ore, and ends with the stockpiling of completed bombs. A 
basic layout of the production process is displayed in 
Figure 2. Two alternate processes may be used. Each 
process shares the same initial steps but they then split 
and subsequently only contain stockpiling as a common 
activity. A uranium-based program splits from the 
plutonium-based program after the enrichment phase. The 
uranium process consists of 30 activities, while the 
plutonium process consists of 55, of these totals, 20 are 
common to both programs. 
2. Process Selection 
The PERT/CPM model, 
mathematical models, does 
which forms 
not include 
the basis of our 
the possibility of 
performing certain activities or achieving 
objectives by one of several means. For 
more general 
example, how 
reactor fuel is obtained, by purchasing or production, must 
be known prior to formulating the PERT/CPM model, and 
similarly, the option of building nuclear weapons by the 
uranium or plutonium process cannot be an embedded choice in 
the model. We will assume that the means of completing each 
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Figure 2. Nuclear Weapon Production Process. 
activity and the overall program used by the proliferator is 
known. Nevertheless, it is convenient to maintain a 
database that includes information on the full range of 
possible activities. When running the "what-if" PERT /CPM 
model or the optimal interdiction model this allows the user 
to quickly ascertain the impact of the proliferator 
selecting alternate activities or processes. 
3. Time to Completion 
The completion time for a weapon depends on both the 
individual activity times and the chosen fissile material 
process, uranium or plutonium. The time to complete an 
activity, in turn, depends on how the activity is performed, 
e.g., purchasing or constructing. Most activities must be 
completed sequentially, but some can occur concurrently. 
The completion times for each activity are required for both 
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the critical path calculation and the time delay for process 
interdiction. 
4. Cost of Completion 
The cost of overtly building a small-scale, 
plutonium-based nuclear weapon is approximately 300 million 
( 1992$) . A uranium-based weapon costs about 200 million 
(1992$). The cost of either program would be 10-20 times 
higher if efforts were made to keep the program secret. The 
largest cost in the plutonium cycle is the construction and 
operation of the nuclear reactor, approximately 100 million 
(1992$ overt). In the uranium cycle, the enrichment 
facility can account for about half of the capital cost of 
the weapon. 
In the models we develop, each activity has an 
associated cost to completion. This cost relates to either 
the construction of the facility and equipment or the 
purchasing of same from another nation. All costs are in 
1992 U.S. dollars. Table 1 shows a major process breakdown 
of the costs for building a plutonium-based weapon. 
5. Social Impact 
There are two important factors to consider when 
determining the social impact of an interdiction effort. 
First and most important is the location of the activity. 
In contrast to remotely located facilities, the collateral 
damage caused in a large population center would have a 
major impact. The reaction of the proliferating government 
and how it relates to the social issues in the country 
should also be considered. The social impact will be on a 
nominal scale between 1 and 10 for use in the optimization 
model. [Ref. 4] 
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Activities 1992 Costs 
(in mill$) 
Capital Costs of Construction 
Uranium Mining Site (55,000t ore/yr): 1. 5-15 
Milling Plant (lOOt U30 8 /yr): 8-9 
Conversion Plant (85t uranium-metal/yr) : 12-14 
Fuel Fabrication Plant: 6-10 
(85t natural uranium fuel/yr) 
30-MWt Production Reactor: 35-100 
(Brookhaven-type, air-cooled, graphite 
moderated, aluminum-clad natural uranium 
fuel; lower cost of "stripped down" 
facility with little shielding) 
PUREX Reprocessing Plant: 12-36 
(85t heavy metal/yr, very low burn-up 
fuel, batch processing, recovering about 
lOkg of plutonium/yr; low estimate for 
facility with little radiation shielding) 
RDT&E Costs for above Facilities: 10-30 
(10%-15% of the capital costs) 
Start-up Costs for the above Facilities: 15-45 
(20%-25% of the capital costs) 
Design and Manufacture of first Weapons: 20-65 
(capital cost of weapons lab, RDT&E of 
the design phase, and non-nuclear 
components, 20%-25% of total cost of 
plutonium production (all above costs) 
Total Cost of First Plutonium-based Weapon 120-300 
Table 1. Nom1nal Costs for an Overt Small-Scale Plutonlum-
Based Weapons Program. From Ref. [6]. 
6. Economic Impact 
The severity of the interdiction effort has direct 
relation to the economic impact. It can be related on 
either a regional or national scale. The regional impact is 
proportional to the industrial destruction or agricultural 
contamination. The use of an embargo or large-scale 
destruction would have a significant national impact. The 
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impact of both was demonstrated in the Persian Gulf War. 
Economic data is also related to a nominal scale. [Ref. 4] 
7. Retaliatory Effort 
The possible retaliation by a proliferator in response 
to an act of interdiction is a concern to the decision 
maker. Options available range from no retaliatory action 
to an all-out declaration of war on the interdictor. If the 
proliferator is covertly producing the weapon, the 
retaliation options may be more restricted in order to 
reduce the attention drawn from the world community. "Low 
end" scale retaliations are political in nature and consist 
of protesting to international organizations or severing 
political ties. "High end" retaliation consists generally 
of acts of violence. Local or international terrorism, 
limited war or a nuclear weapon response may be retaliatory 
options open to the proliferator. 
8. Interdiction Effort 
The interdiction efforts that the United States may 
consider depend on the complexity of the situation and the 
location of the facilities. Even the interdiction of the 
same activity will depend on how the facilities are 
constructed, e.g., above or below ground. The range of 
interdiction effort may be as low as diplomatic means and 
progress through economic methods up to military 
intervention. The largest effort expended would be 
full-scale war against the proliferator, as in Iraq. The 
use of Special Operations Forces to covertly destroy 
facilities is possible, but assets are limited and their 
loss would be costly to national security. Export 
restrictions on nuclear materials could serve the same 
purpose as military action with less risk. The interdiction 
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effort will be rated on a nominal scale to be consistent 
with the optimization model. 
The nominal relationship between the data collected and 
the data to be used in the optimization model is displayed 
in Table 2. 
Nominal Cost Social Economic Retaliatory Effort 
Value $million Impact Impact Response 
1 >100 none none none none 
2 50-100 local local public public 
damage damage complaints pressure 
3 25-49 minimal major world-wide U.N. 
death local protest pressure 
damage 
4 15-24 major minor formal U.N./ 
local industry U.N. economic 
damage damage protest sanctions 
5 9-14 minor major formal naval/ 
regional industry U.N. air 
impact damage sanctions blockade 
6 6-8 major economic terrorist cruise 
regional sanctions attack on missile 
impact ally attacks 
7 4-5 minor minor terrorist special 
national regional attack on operation 
impact damage u.s. soil forces 
8 2-3 major major wide spread small-
national regional terrorism scale air 
impact damage strikes 
9 1 social economic nuclear large-
upheaval turmoil terrorism scale air 
strikes 
10 <1 large massive declaration declare 
scale nuclear of war on war 
deaths leakage u.s or ally 
Table 2. Relatlonshlp of Nomlnal Values to Interdlctlon 
Factors. 
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B. "WHAT-IF" PERT/CPM MODEL 
The careful planning, scheduling, and coordinating of 
numerous interrelated activities is crucial in the 
successful management of any large-scale project. The 
completion of these tasks may be aided by formal procedures 
based on network optimization. The most prominent of these 
techniques is the PERT/CPM methodology. In the terminology 
of PERT /CPM the arcs are called "activities" and the nodes 
refer to "events". [Ref. 7] The precedence relations refer 
to the time-sequence in which certain activities must be 
performed. For example, in developing a nuclear weapon, 
fuel fabrication must be completed before reactor operation 
can begin, but the construction of facilities for both can 
be performed simultaneously. 
Every PERT model can be represented by a directed 
acyclic network (see Appendix B), in which the nodes are 
defined as points in time when all activities on paths 
leading to that node have been completed. Arc lengths 
represent the time required to complete the corresponding 
activity. The precedence relationship between activities 
determine the network structure; in particular, one arc 
precedes another if and only if, the corresponding activity 
must be completed prior to its successor. The longest path 
from the "start" node to the "termination" node represents 
the minimum time it takes to complete the project. This 
longest path is called the critical path because a delay in 
completing any activity on that path will delay project 
completion. 
The PERT problem can be formulated as the following 
network flow problem: 
maximize L(i, j)eA TIME i j Xi J 
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subject to ( 1) 
'\;1 i E N, i f£ { s, t} (2) 
(3) 
'\i(i, j) E A ( 4) 
Where A and N are the sets of arcs and nodes, respectively. 
The index s represents the "start" and t, the "termination". 
In the objective function, TIMEii is the time to complete 
activity (i, j). The variable xii indicates whether activity 
(i,j) is on the critical path. When xii = 1, TIMEii is 
included in the summation which represents the length of the 
critical path. The constraints enforce the balance of flow 
at each node and, when viewed as a matrix, it is totally 
unimodular. This implies that the PERT problem has an 
optimal solution which is integer, i.e., xii is either 0 or 
1. 
There are many commercially available software packages 
to solve the above PERT problem. MacProj ect Pro [Ref. 8] 
from Claris Corporation is chosen for this thesis. 
MacProj ect Pro allows data such as TIMEii, 
relationships which defines the arc set 
the precedence 
A, and other 
activity information to be entered easily. Given all the 
necessary inputs, MacProject Pro then solves the PERT 
problem and has facilities that allow users to view the 
solution graphically or in outline form. 
By modifying the data in MacProject Pro and resolving 
the PERT problem, the users can conduct "what-if" analysis. 
For example, creating a delay on an arc (i.e., an activity) 
and resolving the PERT model, MacProject Pro provides a new 
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solution that indicates the result of interdicting the 
activity. MacProj ect Pro provides the new (and hopefully 
longer) completion time as well as a new critical path. 
Table 3 provides results from several interdictions based on 
data in Appendix A. In all cases, MacProject Pro solved the 
PERT problem in under 5 seconds, and, in most cases the run 
time was negligible. 
Interdicted Activities Completion Additional 
time (months) time due to 
interdiction 
No Interdiction (Pu cycle) 115.5 0 
Interdiction of spent fuel 121.5 6 
storage activity (Pu cycle) 
Interdiction of reactor 193.5 78 
construction activity and 
spent fuel storage (Pu cycle) 
No Interdiction (U cycle) 46.5 0 
Interdiction of gaseous 70.5 24 
enrichment activity (U cycle) 
Interdiction of gaseous 86.5 40 
enrichment facility 
construction and operation 
activity (U cycle) 
Table 3. Results from "what-if" analysis. 
C. OPTIMAL INTERDICTION PROBLEM 
In this section, we generalize the PERT problem to a 
problem that selects a set of activities to interdict with 
the objective of inducing the maximum project delay. To 
formulate the optimal interdiction problem, define yi' as a 
binary variable that equals 1 if activity (i, j) is to be 
interdicted and zero otherwise. Also, let DTIMEii denote 
the delay in completing activity (i,j) if it is interdicted, 
and let INTPTS denote the maximum number of activities that 
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may be interdicted. Then optimal interdiction problem can 
be mathematically stated as: 
maximize f(y) 
subject to L(i,j)eAYij:::;; INTPTS (5) 
YijE{0,1} V(i, j) E A 
where 
f(y) =maximize 
subject to Equations (1) - (4) 
This _ optimal interdiction model has the following 
interpretation. First, the interdicting country selects at 
most INTPTS activities to interrupt. The inner maximization 
problem represents the situation faced by the proliferating 
country. In particular, the interdicted activities result 
in delays DTIMEij activated by the outer optimization's 
binary variables yij and induces a PERT problem of the form 
covered in section B. As a result of the interdiction, the 
proliferating country is expected to respond in an optimal 
manner, i.e., by computing the earliest project completion 
time via the PERT problem. This sequenced pair of 
optimization problems may be rewritten as the following 
single optimization problem: 
maximize 
subject to Equations (1) - (5) 
Xi71 YiJ E {0, 1} V(i, j) E A 
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Note the objective 
due to the xiiyii 
function of this problem is 
cross term in the objective 
non-linear 
function. 
However, the fact that both xii and yii are binary, allows 
the objective function to be made linear by introducing an 
auxiliary variable qii and additional constraints. This 
procedure produces the following linear integer program. 
maximize 
subject to Equations (1) - (4) and 
( 6) 
(7) 
Xijl YiJ E {0, 1} V(i, j) E A ( 8) 
'vl(i, j) E A (9) 
From (6) and (7) and the maximization, qii equals 1 when 
both xii and yii equal 1. This corresponds to the case that 
activity (i,j) is on the critical path and being 
interdicted, thereby resulting in the addition of DTIMEii to 
constitute the delay in project completion. On the other 
hand, when either xii or yii but not both equal 1, qii is 
forced to zero since either case produces no delay. 
D. MODEL EXTENSIONS 
As presented in the previous section, the optimal 
interdiction problem does not restrict which arcs can be 
interdicted. However, in practice, this may be unreasonable 
since available resources are generally limited, and the 
impact on, and potential response of, the proliferator must 
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be taken into account. This section presents a possible set 
of constraints that limit the number and types of activities 



















Maximum allowable activity cost 
Maximum allowable social impact 
Maximum allowable economic impact 
Maximum allowable retaliatory response 
Maximum allowable interdiction effort 
Maximum number of activities to interdict 
Adjustment factor for cumulative effect 
Then the extended optimal interdiction problem can be 
written as: 
maximize 
subject to: Equations (1) - (9) and 
LijeA COSTij x Yij:::; INTPTS x MXCOST ( 10) 
LijeASOCij xyij :s;ADJx INTPTSxMXSOC ( 11) 
L. 11 eAECONij x Yij:::; ADJx INTPTS x MXECON ( 12) 




Constraints (9)-(13) limit the cost and various impacts due 
to the interdiction efforts specified by y1 i to be less than 
the maximum levels. Furthermore, the values of MXSOC, 
MXECON, and MXRETAL have an adjustment factor to restrict 
the cumulative effects of interdicting several activities. 
Whereas, MXCOST and MXEFF allow direct multiples of INTPTS 
to be accumulated. 
It is this optimal interdiction problem and the above 
extension that were implemented and solved using GAMS [Ref. 
9] with an integer program solver called XA [Ref. 10]. The 
GAMS program is listed in Appendix C and the next chapter 
discusses results from solving the above problem using two 
data sets. 
E . RELATED WORK 
Some of the related work to this formulation include: 
(1) The CPM method of time-cost trade-offs in which a 
premium cost is paid (e.g., overtime labor) in order to 
accelerate completion of certain activities. In our case 
the analog is to delay the completion of the project for the 
longest possible time. [Ref. 6, ch. 10] 
( 2) A deterministic network interdiction model was 
formulated by R. Kevin Wood and R. Steinrauf to interdict 
drug operations in South America. While the drug 
traffickers were trying to maximize the flow on the network 
the interdictor was trying to minimize that flow by 
interdicting network arcs using limited resources. [Ref. 7 
and Ref. 8] 
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IV RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
This chapter presents and analyzes solutions obtained 
from solving the optimal interdiction problem and its 
extension using two different sets of input data. One data 
set is from a uranium-based, gaseous enrichment nuclear 
weapons program and the other is from a plutonium-based, 
metal enrichment nuclear weapons program. Data from the 
latter process is included in Appendix D. 
A. URANIUM-BASED, GASEOUS ENRICHMENT NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
PROGRAM 
The uranium-based process consists of highly enriching 
uranium to a concentration above 90% U-235. To achieve this 
level of concentration, the uranium is cycled through 
multiple stages in the enrichment facility. Activities with 
the longer delay times are associated with interdicting the 
construction of the facilities housing production 
activities. Table 4 summarizes the interdiction results 
from the optimization model. 
The CPU times in Table 4 are from a 66MHz, 4 8 6DX2 
personal computer. The completion times also indicate that 
the additional delay is diminishing as the number of 
activities for interdiction increases. Considering the cost 
I 
and impact of additional activity interdiction, Table 4 
suggests that it may not be advantageous to consider more 
than one interdiction. 
The result of the two activity interdiction may seem 
counter-intuitive when compared to the solution generated by 
the PERT problem. Interdicting the construction of the 
enrichment facility would add 15 months vice the 11 added by 
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Number of activities to interdict 
Activity 0 1 2 3 








UF6 Reduction X 
Time to 46.5 70.5 81.5 87.5 
Completion months months months months 
CPU time 1 sec. 1 sec. 29 sec. 10 sec. 
Table 4. Summary of Uranium-Based Model Results. 
the second interdicted activity. In reviewing the data set, 
the reason for this choice is the retaliatory response 
constraint. The cumulative effects of retaliation in 
selecting both the enrichment facility construction and 
enrichment process would exceed the acceptable retaliatory 
response risk. It is interesting to note that the 
construction of the purification facility was not on the 
original critical path. However, as a result of 
interdiction the proliferating country's critical path has 
been changed to include this activity. 
The first two activities in the three activity 
interdiction model are infeasible for the two activity 
model. This combination is permissible in the three 
activity model because the cumulative risk constraints (in 
this case retaliatory response) depend on the number of 
allowed interdiction points. In other words, the 
interdicting country's willingness to accept cumulative risk 
is reflected in the number of permissible interdiction 
36 
points. The induced critical path is different from either 
the one or two activity interdiction models. 
B. PLUTONIUM-BASED, METAL ENRICHMENT NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
PROGRAM 
The production of a plutonium-based nuclear weapon 
requires several more time-consuming and difficult processes 
than the uranium-based program. One such process is the 
requirement for the irradiation of uranium to produce 
plutonium. This process requires the construction and 
operation of a nuclear reactor, a major investment in both 
time and resources. 
During preliminary testing, interdicting the 
construction of the reactor for the radiation process 
dominates, and prevents the optimization and PERT models 
from considering interdiction of other activities. In 
practice, the destruction of the reactor, during 
construction, is the best option to delay proliferation. 
However, unless the proliferation intention is widely known, 
a pre-emptive strike on the reactor would be premature. 
When the reactor is fully operational and the intention of 
building a weapons program is evident, it would be 
unacceptable to destroy the reactor. 
To allow for the interdiction of other activities, the 
activity associated with reactor construction was made 
infeasible for interdiction but still acceptable in the 
critical path. Table 5 summarizes the results for the 
plutonium-based program without interdicting the irradiation 
process. Unlike the uranium-based program, the additional 
delay does not seem to diminish as the number of activities 
interdicted increases. This, however, is not unexpected 
37 
since integer programs do not necessarily generate concave 
optimal value functions. 
Number of activities to interdict 
~ctivity 0 1 2 3 











Time to 115.5 121.5 122.5 136 
Completion months months months months 
CPU time 3 sec. 18 sec. 297 sec. 41 sec. 
Table 4. Summary of Plutonium-Based Model Results. 
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V CONCLUSION 
This thesis has demonstrated that developing a strategy 
for the control of the proliferation of nuclear weapons can 
be aided through the use of two decision tools: an optimal 
interdiction model and a "what-if" PERT/CPM model. These 
models have their respective strengths and weaknesses. 
Developing a good interdiction strategy depends on the 
subjective judgment of experts that may be difficult to 
capture in an optimization model, and we do not advocate the 
use of the optimal interdiction model as a stand-alone 
decision aid. Nevertheless, the analysis we have shown here 
indicates that the optimal interdiction model can provide 
non-trivial insights to interdiction strategies given the 
chosen constraints. 
The PERT/CPM model provides a 
user-friendly over-all view of the 
more graphical and 
process but can be 
cumbersome to operate in the "what-if" mode on its own. The 
combination of the two models provides a starting point to 
aid decision makers. The optimal interdiction model directs 
the decision maker to those activities which are the best to 
interdict with respect to the constraints chosen. From 
there, the decision maker can look to the PERT/CPM model for 
more in-depth guidance on the effects of their decision. 
The uranium-based two activity interdiction model 
provides a good example of how the two models complement 
each other. The optimal activities for interdiction are the 
construction and operation of the enrichment facility. The 
decision maker can interpret this result and determine the 
best course of action. If based on intelligence information, 
the decision maker determined the enrichment activity 
operation phase was nearing completion, the interdicting 
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country could destroy the facility. This would essentially 
return the proliferator to step one, and only require the 
interdictor to make one effort. It would not be as easy to 
arrive at this strategy with the use of the optimal 
interdiction model alone. 
There are many areas of this thesis that require 
follow-on work. The first is in the area of data 
collection. The development of a real-time data set could 
prove a difficult task. The conversion of relevant world 
intelligence reports into a nominal data set would require 
the interpretation by experts in the field and development 
of a consensus on those results. Many of these 
interpretations would also depend on the decision makers 
themselves. Their feelings on the risks involved with 
counterproliferation could impact the nominal values. This 
data set would also require real-time update capability to 
match constantly changing world situations. 
Capturing the time dynamics of the interdiction problem 
within the optimization model represents a challenging 
problem for future research. The models we have developed 
are based on what is essentially historical data and do not 
necessarily capture the notion of the ''current status" of a 
proliferator's weapons program. The status of which 
activities have been completed, which are ongoing, and which 
are yet to begin may play an important role in developing an 
interdiction strategy. Based on the quality of intelligence 
reports there may be some level of uncertainty associated 
with a projects current status, and this factor hardly 
simplifies matters. 
An additional area of uncertainty that may warrant 
future attention is the fact that an interdiction effort may 
not succeed with a probability of one. 
40 
Moreover there may 
be random delays in the completion time of the activity 
associated with the degree of an interdiction success. 
These areas of follow-on work represent important and 
challenging problems. The PERT /CPM model and the optimal 
interdiction models that we have developed lend themselves 
to such generalizations and could serve as launching points 











































































minor regional impact/5 
minor regional impact/5 
minor regional impact/5 
minor regional impact/5 
minor regional impact/5 
minor regional impact/5 
minor regional impact/5 : 
minor regional impact/5 
minor regional impact/5 
minor regional impact/5 
minor regional impact/5 
minor regional impact/5 
minor regional impact/5 













































major industry damage/5 
major industry damage/5 
major industry damage/5 
major Industry damage/5 
major industry damage/5 
major industry damage/5 
major industry damage/5 
major industry damage/5 
major industry damage/5 
major industry damage/5 
major industry damage/5 
major industry damage/5 
major industry damage/5 
major industry damage/5 
Retaliatory Response 
formal U.N. protest/4 
formal U.N. protest/4 
formal U.N. protest/4 
formal U.N. protest/4 
formal U.N. protest/4 
formal U.N. protest/4 
formal U.N. protest/4 
formal U.N. protest/4 
formal U.N. protest/4 
formal U.N. protest/4 
formal U.N. protest/4 
formal U.N. protest/4 
formal U.N. protest/4 
formal U.N. protest/4 
formal U.N. protest/4 
formal U.N. protest/4 
terrorist attack in U.S./7 
terrorist attack in U.S./7 
terrorist attack in U.S./7 
formal U.N. protest/4 
Interdiction Effort 
Large-scale air strike/9 
cruise missile attack/6 
cruise missile attack/6 
cruise missile attack/6 
cruise missile attack/6 
cruise missile attack/6 
small-scale air strike/8 
small-scale air strike/8 
small-scale air strike/8 
small-scale air strike/8 
small-scale air strike/8 
small-scale air strike/8 
small-scale air strike/8 
small-scale air strike/8 
small-scale air strike/8 
small-scale air strike/8 
cruise missile attack/6 
cruise missile attack/6 
cruise missile attack/6 















































Cost (Million 92 Social Impact 
10.00 minor regional impact/5 
8.00 local damage/2 
7.00 local damage/2 
8.00 local damage/2 
5.00 local damage/2 
20.00 minor national impact/7 
0.00 not available/10 
3.00 not available/1 0 
7.00 minor regional impact/5 
3.00 minor regional impact/5 
3.00 minor regional impact/5 
2.00 minor regional impact/5 
4.00 minor regional impact/5 
2.00 minor regional impact/5 
7.00 minor regional impact/5 
4.00 minor regional impact/5 
3.00 minor regional impact/5 
2.00 minor regional impact/5 
10.00 minor regional impact/5 
30.00 minor national impact/7 
Name Economic Impact 
Bomb Reduction maJor industry damage/5 
Casting maJor industry damage/5 
Forming maJor industry damage/5 
Machine Finishing maJor industry damage/5 
Clean/ Inspection maJor Industry damage/5 
U Device Assembly minor regional damage/7 
Stockpile not available/1 0 
Chemical Recovery not available/1 o 
Oxide Conversion maJor Industry damage/5 
Direct Oxidation maJor industry damage/5 
U/F3 Alloy Dissolution maJor industry damage/5 
Solvent Extraction maJor industry damage/5 
Denitration maJor industry damage/5 
Oxide Reduction maJor industry damage/5 
ADU Precipitation maJor industry damage/5 
Grind/Press maJor industry damage/5 
Oxide Reduction maJor industry damage/5 
Scintering maJor industry damage/5 
Metal Alloy Fabrication maJor industry damage/5 
Reactor Operation maJor regional damage/8 
Retaliatory Response 
formal U.N. protest/4 
terrorist attack in U .S./7 
terrorist attack in U.S./7 
terrorist attack in U.S./7 
terrorist attack in U.S./7 
wide spread terrorism /8 
not available/1 0 
not available/1 0 
formal U.N. protest/4 
formal U.N. protest/4 
formal U.N. protest/4 
formal U.N. sanctions/5 
formal U.N. sanctions/5 
formal U.N. sanctions/5 
formal U.N. sanctions/5 
formal U.N. sanctions/5 
formal U.N. sanctions/5 
formal U.N. sanctions/5 
formal U.N. sanctions/5 
wide spread terrorism/a 
Interdiction Effort 
small-scale air strike/8 
cruise missile attack/6 
cruise missile attack/6 
cruise missile attack/6 
cruise missile attack/6 
cruise missile attack/6 
not available/1 0 
not available/1 0 
small-scale air strike/8 
small-scale air strike/8 
small-scale air strike/8 
small-scale air strike/8 
small-scale air strike/8 
small-scale air strike/8 
small-scale air strike/8 
small-scale air strike/8 
small-scale air strike/8 
small-scale air strike/8 
small-scale air strike/8 












Direct Oxide Reduction 




































Cost (Million 92 Social Impact 
6.00 minimal death/3 
4.00 minimal death/3 
2.00 minimal death/3 
5.00 minimal death/3 
7.00 minimal death/3 
4.00 minor regional impact/5 
2.00 minor regional impact/5 
2.00 minor regional impact/5 
8.00 minor regional impact/5 
10.00 minor regional impact/5 
6.00 minor regional impact/5 
8.00 minor regional impact/5 
7.00 minor regional impact/5 
6.00 minor regional impact/5 
8.00 minor regional impact/5 
7.00 minor regional impact/5 
13.00 minor regional impact/5 
10.00 minor regional impact/5 
8.00 minor regional impact/5 
24.00 minor national impact/7 
---- ---- -------
Name Economic Impact 
Spent Fuel Storage major industry damage/5 
Shearing major industry damage/5 
Chemical Separation major industry damage/5 
Purification major Industry damage/5 
Oxide Conversion major industry damage/5 
Oxide Calcination minor regional damage/7 
Direct Oxide Reduction minor regional damage/7 
Molten Salt Extraction minor regional damage/7 
Anode Casting minor regional damage/7 
Electrorefining minor regional damage/7 
Casting/ Annealing major local damage/3 
Ingot/ Cast major local damage/3 
Near Shape Casting major local damage/3 
Heat Treat major local damage/3 
Rolling/ Blanking major local damage/3 
Press/ Debrimming major local damage/3 
Machining major local damage/3 
Assembly/ Joining major local damage/3 
Clean/ Inspection major local damage/3 
Pu Device Assembly minor regional damage/7 
Retaliatory Response 
terrorist attack in U .S./7 
terrorist attack on ally/6 
terrorist attack on ally/6 
terrorist attack on ally/6 
terrorist attack on ally/6 
terrorist attack in U.S./7 
terrorist attack in U.S./7 
terrorist attack in U.S./7 
terrorist attack in U.S./7 
terrorist attack in U.S./7 
terrorist attack in U.S./7 
terrorist attack in U.S./7 
terrorist attack in U.S./7 
terrorist attack in U.S./7 
terrorist attack in U.S./7 
terrorist attack in U.S./7 
terrorist attack in U .S./7 
terrorist attack in U.S./7 
terrorist attack in U.S./7 
wide spread terrorism/a 
Interdiction Effort 
cruise missile attack/6 
cruise missile attack/6 
cruise missile attack/6 
cruise missile attack/6 
cruise missile attack/6 
small-scale air strikes/a 
small-scale air strikes/8 
small-scale air strikes/8 
small-scale air strikes/8 
small-scale air strikes/8 
cruise missile attack/6 
cruise missile attack/6 
cruise missile attack/6 
cruise missile attack/6 
cruise missile attack/6 
cruise missile attack/6 
cruise missile attack/6 
cruise missile attack/6 
cruise missile attack/6 

















Purchase Spent Fuel 














(Million 92 Social Impact 
4.00 minor regional impact/5 
20.00 none/1 I 
5.00 none/1 
4.00 not available/1 0 
8.00 minimal death/3 
10.00 minimal death/3 
40.00 major local damage/4 
120.00 minor regional impact/5 
20.00 minor regional impact/5 
10.00 minor regional impact/5 
0.00 not available/1 0 
60.00 none/1 
Name Economic Impact 
Electrolytic Reduction major industry damage/5 
Purchase Fuel economic sanctions/6 
Purchase Yellowcake economic sanctions/6 
Residue Recovery not available/1 o 
Construct Mine/ Mill local damage/2 
Construct Facility local damage/2 
Construct Facility local damage/2 
Reactor Construction minor regional damage/7 
Fabrication Facility major local damage/3 
Construct Reprocessing major local damage/3 
Leaching/ Dissolving not available!JO 
Purchase Spent Fuel economic sanctions/6 
Retaliatory Response 
formal U.N. protest/4 
formal U.N. protesV4 
formal U.N. protest/4 
not available/10 
formal U.N. protest/4 
formal U.N. protest/4 
cruise missile attack/6 
wide spread terrorism/8 
terrorist attack in U.S./7 
terrorist attack in U.S./7 
not available/10 
formal U.N. protesV4 
Interdiction Effort 
cruise missile attack/6 
U.N./economic sanctions/4 
U. N./economic sanctions/4 
not available/1 0 
large-scale air strikes/9 
cruise missile attack/6 
cruise missile attack/6 
small-scale air strikes/a 
cruise missile attack/6 
small-scale air strikes/a 
not available/10 



































24 1 0.0( 
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APPENDIX C. GAMS MODEL FORMULATION 
Proliferation Interdiction Response Analysis 
Brian K. Reed 
*------------GAMS AND DOLLAR CONTROL OPTIONS----------------
$0FFUPPER OFFSYMLIST OFFSYMXREF 
OPTIONS LIMCOL =0, LIMROW = 0, SOLPRINT = OFF, DECIMALS = 2 
RESLIM = 1000, ITERLIM = 10000, OPTCR = 0.0, SEED= 3141; 
*----------------------------------------------------------






activities in the process /S,T,Q,1*57/ 
attributes of activity /CP chosen production path 
TIME activity completion 
DTIME induced time delay 
COST cost to build 
(I,J,K); 
D (I, J, ATTR) 
SOC social impact 
ECON economic impact 
RETAL retaliatory response 
EFF interdiction effort/; 
network data 
$INCLUDE PLUTOMET.DAT 
SCALAR MXCOST minimum acceptable cost/7/ 
MXSOC maximum acceptable social impact/7/ 
MXECON maximum acceptable economic impact/7/ 
61 
MXRETAL maximum acceptable retaliation/7/ 
MXEFF maximum effort expended by interdictor/8/ 
INTPTS number of interdiction points/1/ 







ACT (I, J) 
PATH(I,J) 
INTEGER VARIABLE 
activities available to interdict 
activities on the induced critical path; 






STCOST (I I J) 
STSOC(I,J) 
STECON (I, J) 




total time to completion; 
defines the objective function 
balance the flow through the path 
achieve maximum cost 
achieve minimum social impact 
achieve minimum economic impact 
achieve minimum retaliation 
achieve minimum effort expenditure 
cumulative cost restriction 









PATHRES (I, J) 
ACTRES (I, J) 
cumulative economic restriction 
cumulative retaliatory resrtriction 
cumulative interdiction effort 
number of interdiction points 
restrict value of intdict 
restrict value of intdict; 
>>> MAXIMIZE <<< 
TOTIME =E= SUM((I,J)$(D(I,J, 11 CP 11 ) GT 0), 
D(I,J, 11 TIME")*PATH(I,J) + D(I,J,"DTIME 11 )*INTDICT(I,J)); 
>>> SUBJECT TO <<< 
FLOWBAL ( I ) .. 
SUM(J$(D(I,J, 11 CP 11 ) GT 0), PATH(I,J)) -
SUM(K$(D(K,I, 11 CP 11 ) GT 0), PATH(K,I)) =E= INOUT(I); 
STCOST(I,J)$(D(I,J, 11 CP") GT 0) .. 
D(I,J ,"COST")*ACT(I,J) =L= MXCOST; 
s T soc ( I ' J) $ ( D ( I ' J' II c p II ) G T 0 ) .. 
D(I,J ,"SOC")*ACT(I,J) =L= MXSOC; 
STECON(I,J)$(D(I,J, 11 CP 11 ) GT 0) .. 
D(I,J , 11 ECON 11 )*ACT(I,J) =L= MXECON; 
STRETAL(I,J)$(D(I,J, 11 CP 11 ) GT 0) .. 
D(I,J , 11 RETAL 11 )*ACT(I,J) =L= MXRETAL; 
STEFF(I,J)$(D(I,J, 11 CP 11 ) GT 0) .. 
D(I,J ,"EFF 11 )*ACT(I,J) =L= MXEFF; 
63 
STCCOST$(INTPTS GT 1) .. 
SUM((I 1 J)$(D(I 1 J 1 "CP") GT 0) 1 
D(I 1 J 1 "COST")*ACT(I 1 J)) =L= INTPTS*MXCOST; 
STCSOC$(INTPTS GT 1) .. 
SUM((I 1 J)$(D(I 1 J 1 "CP") GT 0) 1 
D(I 1 J 1 "SOC")*ACT(I 1 J)) =L= ADJ*INTPTS*MXSOC; 
STCECON$(INTPTS GT 1) .. 
SUM((I 1 J)$(D(I 1 J 1 "CP") GT 0) 1 
D(I 1 J 1 "ECON")*ACT(I 1 J)) =L= ADJ*INTPTS*MXECON; 
STCRETAL$(INTPTS GT 1) .. 
SUM((I 1 J)$(D(I 1 J 1 "CP") GT 0) 1 
D(I 1 J 1 "RETAL")*ACT(I 1 J)) =L= ADJ*INTPTS*MXRETAL; 
STCEFF$(INTPTS GT 1) .. 
SUM((I 1 J)$(D(I 1 J 1 "CP") GT 0) 1 
D(I 1 J 1 "EFF")*ACT(I 1 J)) =L= INTPTS*MXEFF; 
POINTS .. 
SUM((I 1 J)$(D(I 1 J 1 "CP") GT 0) 1 INTDICT(I 1 J)) =L= INTPTS; 
PATHRES (I I J) .. 
INTDICT(I 1 J) =L= ACT(I 1 J); 
ACTRES (I I J) .. 
INTDICT(I 1 J) =L= PATH(I 1 J); 
*-----------------------------------------------------------
64 
MODEL PIRA /ALL/; 
SOLVE PIRA USING MIP MAXIMIZING TOTIME; DISPLAY ACT.L, 


























































































































































































































































































































































MET /ALLY /FAB 0 
SOLV/EXTRAC 1 
33 34 DENITRAT 1 
34 36 OXIDE/RED 1 
32 36 OXIDE/RED 0 
36 37 GRIND/PRESS 1 
37 38 SCINTERING 1 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































APPENDIX E. MODEL OUTPUT 
A. URANIUM-BASED, GASEOUS ENRICHMENT NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
PROGRAM 
1. Zero Interdiction Points 
Proliferation Interdiction Response Analysis Execution 
VARIABLE ACT.L activities available to interdict 
ALL 0.00 ) 
VARIABLE PATH.L activities on the induced critical path 
T 1 2 3 4 5 
s 1. 00 
1 1. 00 
2 1. 00 
3 1. 00 
4 1. 00 
31 1. 00 
+ 6 7 8 10 11 12 
5 1. 00 
6 1. 00 
7 1. 00 
8 1. 00 
10 1. 00 
11 1. 00 
71 
+ 16 17 18 21 26 27 
12 1. 00 
16 1. 00 
17 1. 00 
18 1. 00 
21 1. 00 
26 1. 00 
+ 28 29 30 31 
27 1. 00 
28 1. 00 
29 1. 00 
30 1. 00 
VARIABLE INTDICT.L actual activity interdicted 
ALL 0.00 ) 
VARIABLE TOTIME.L = 46.50 total time to completion 
2. One Interdiction Point 
Proliferation Interdiction Response Analysis Execution 
VARIABLE ACT.L 
18 
activities available to interdict 
17 1. 00 
72 
VARIABLE PATH.L activities on the induced critical path 
T 1 2 3 4 5 
s 1. 00 
1 1. 00 
2 1. 00 
3 1. 00 
4 1. 00 
31 1. 00 
+ 6 7 8 10 11 12 
5 1. 00 
6 1. 00 
7 1. 00 
8 1. 00 
10 1. 00 
11 1. 00 
+ 16 17 18 21 26 27 
12 1. 00 
16 1. 00 
17 1. 00 
18 1. 00 
21 1. 00 
26 1. 00 
+ 28 29 30 31 
27 1. 00 
28 1. 00 
29 1. 00 




17 1. 00 
VARIABLE TOTIME.L 
actual activity interdicted 
70.50 total time to completion 
3. Two Interdiction Points 
Proliferation Interdiction Response Analysis Execution 
VARIABLE ACT.L activities available to interdict 
7 18 
s 1. 00 
17 1. 00 
VARIABLE PATH.L activities on the induced critical path 
T 7 8 10 11 12 
s 1. 00 
7 1. 00 
8 1. 00 
10 1. 00 
11 1. 00 
31 1. 00 
+ 16 17 18 21 26 27 
12 1. 00 
16 1. 00 
17 1. 00 
18 1. 00 
21 1. 00 
26 1. 00 
74 
(' 
+ 28 29 30 31 










actual activity interdicted 
18 
1. 00 
81.50 total time to completion 
4. Three Interdiction Points 
Proliferation Interdiction Response Analysis Execution 
VARIABLE ACT.L 
17 18 





VARIABLE PATH.L activities on the induced critical path 
T 17 18 21 26 27 
s 1. 00 
17 1. 00 
18 1. 00 
21 1. 00 
26 1. 00 
31 1. 00 
75 
+ 28 29 30 31 






s 1. 00 
17 1.00 
actual activity interdicted 
21 
18 1.00 
VARIABLE TOTIME.L 87.50 total time to completion 
B. PLUTONIUM-BASED, METAL ENRICHMENT NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
PROGRAM 
1. Zero Interdiction Points 
Proliferation Interdiction Response Analysis Execution 
VARIABLE ACT.L activities available to interdict 
ALL 0. 00 ) 
VARIABLE PATH.L activities on the induced critical path 
T 31 38 39 40 41 
s 1. 00 
31 1. 00 
38 1. 00 
39 1. 00 
40 1. 00 







































actual activity interdicted 
ALL 0. 00 ) 
115.50 total time to completion 
2. One Activity Interdiction 







activities available to interdict 
39 1.00 
77 
VARIABLE PATH.L activities on the induced critical path 
T 31 38 39 40 41 
s 1. 00 
31 1. 00 
38 1. 00 
39 1. 00 
40 1. 00 
57 1. 00 
+ 42 43 44 45 46 47 
41 1. 00 
42 1. 00 
43 1. 00 
44 1. 00 
45 1. 00 
46 1. 00 
+ 48 49 52 53 54 55 
47 1. 00 
48 1. 00 
49 1. 00 
52 1. 00 
53 1. 00 
54 1. 00 
+ 56 57 
55 1. 00 
56 1. 00 
VARIABLE INTDICT.L actual activity interdicted 
40 
39 1. 00 
78 
VARIABLE TOTIME.L 121.50 total time to completion 
3. Two Activity Interdiction 
Proliferation Interdiction Response Analysis Execution 
VARIABLE ACT.L activities available to interdict 
40 41 
39 1. 00 
40 1. 00 
VARIABLE PATH.L activities on the induced critical path 
T 31 38 39 40 41 
s 1. 00 
31 1. 00 
38 1. 00 
39 1. 00 
40 1. 00 
57 1. 00 
+ 42 43 44 45 46 47 
41 1. 00 
42 1. 00 
43 1. 00 
44 1. 00 
45 1. 00 
46 1. 00 
79 
+ 48 49 52 53 54 55 
47 1. 00 
48 1. 00 
49 1. 00 
52 1. 00 
53 1. 00 
54 1. 00 
+ 56 57 
55 1. 00 
56 1. 00 




VARIABLE TOTIME.L = 122.50 total time to completion 
4. Three Activity Interdiction 
Proliferation Interdiction Response Analysis Execution 
VARIABLE ACT.L 
7 20 






VARIABLE PATH.L activities on the induced critical path 
T 7 9 13 14 15 
s 1. 00 
7 1. 00 
9 1. 00 
13 1. 00 
14 1. 00 
31 1. 00 
+ 20 24 31 33 34 36 
15 1. 00 
20 1. 00 
24 1. 00 
33 1. 00 
34 1. 00 
57 1. 00 
+ 39 40 41 42 43 44 
36 1. 00 
39 1. 00 
40 1. 00 
41 1. 00 
42 1. 00 
43 1. 00 
+ 45 46 47 48 49 52 
44 1. 00 
45 1. 00 
46 1. 00 
47 1. 00 
48 1. 00 





















VARIABLE TOTIME.L = 




actual activity interdicted 
39 
1. 00 
136.00 total time to completion 
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GLOSSARY 
Atomic Bomb A bomb whose energy comes from the fission of 
uranium or plutonium. 
Chain Reaction The continuing process of nuclear fissioning 
in which the neutrons released from a fission trigger at 
least one other nuclear fission. In a nuclear weapon an 
extremely rapid, multiplying chain reaction causes the 
explosive release of energy. In a reactor, the pace of the 
chain reaction is controlled to produce heat (in a power 
reactor) or large quanti ties of neutrons (in a research or 
production reactor. 
Chemical Processing Chemical treatment of materials to 
separate specific usable materials. 
Critical Mass Minimum amount of fissionable material 
required to sustain a chain reaction. 
Depleted Uranium Uranium having a smaller concentration of 
uranium-235 than the 0.7 percent found in natural uranium. 
A by-product of the enrichment process. 
Enrichment The process of increasing the concentration of 
one isotope of a given element (in the case of uranium, 
increasing the concentration of uranium-235). 
Fertile Material composed of atoms which readily absorb 
neutrons to produce fissionable materials. Fertile material 
alone cannot sustain a chain reaction. 
Fission The process by which a neutron strikes the nucleus 
and splits it into fragments. During the process of nuclear 
fission, several neutrons are emitted at high speed, and 
heat and light are released. 
Fissile Material Material composed of atoms which readily 
fission when struck by a neutron. Uranium-235 and 
plutonium-239 are some examples of fissile materials. 
Fusion The formation of a heavier nucleus from lighter ones 
(such as hydrogen isotopes), with the attendant release of 
energy (as in a hydrogen bomb) . 
83 
Gas Centrifuge Process A method of isotope separation in 
which heavY. gaseous atoms or molecules are separated from 
the light ones by centrifugal force. See ultracentrifuge. 
Gaseous Diffusion A method of isotope separation based on 
the fact that gas atoms or molecules with different masses 
will diffuse through a porous barrier at different rates. 
The method used to separate uranium-235 from uranium-238. 
It requires large gaseous diffusion plants and significant 
amounts of electricity. 
Highly Enriched Uranium Uranium in which the percentage of 
uranium-235 nuclei has been increased from the natural level 
of 0.7 percent to some level greater than 20 percent, 
usually around 90 percent. 
Hydrogen Bomb A nuclear weapon that derives its energy 
largely from fusion. Also known as a thermonuclear bomb. 
Irradiation 
the case of 
Exposure to a radioactive source; usually in 
fuel materials, being placed in an operating 
nuclear reactor. 
Isotopes Atoms having the same number of protons, but a 
different number of neutrons. Two isotopes of the same atom 
are very similar and difficult to separate by normal 
chemical means. Isotopes can have very different nuclear 
properties, however. For example, one isotope may fission 
readily while another isotope of the same atom may not 
fission at all. An isotope is specified by its atomic mass 
number (the number of protons plus neutrons) following the 
symbol denoting the chemical element (e.g., U23 " is an 
isotope of uranium) . 
Jet-nozzle Enrichment Process a process of uranium 
enrichment that uses both uranium hexafluoride and a light 
gas flowing at high speed through a nozzle along curved 
walls. 
Kiloton The energy of a nuclear explosion that is 
equivalent to an explosion of 1,000 tons of TNT. 
Light-water Reactor A reactor that uses ordinary water 
(H20) as a moderator and coolant and low-enriched uranium as 
fuel. 
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Low-enriched Uranium Uranium in which the percentage of 
uranium-235 nuclei has been increased from the natural level 
of 0.7 percent to less than 20 percent, usually around 3 to 
6 percent. With the increased level of fissile material, 
low-enriched uranium can sustain a chain reaction when 
immersed in light-water and is used as fuel in light-water 
reactors. 
Medium-enriched Uranium Uranium in which the percentage of 
uranium-235 nuclei has been increased from the natural level 
of 0. 7 percent to between 20 and 50 percent. (Potentially 
usable for nuclear weapons, but very large quantities 
needed.) 
Milling A process in the uranium fuel cycle by which ore 
containing only a small percentage of uranium oxide (U 30 8 ) 
is converted into material containing a high percentage (80 
percent) of U30 8 , often referred to as yellowcake. 
Natural Uranium Uranium as found in nature, containing 0.7 
percent of uranium-235, 99.3 percent of urnium-238 and a 
trace of uranium-234. 
Neutron An uncharged particle, with a mass slightly greater 
than that of a proton, found in the nucleus of every atom 
heavier than hydrogen. 
Nuclear Energy The energy liberated by a nuclear reaction 
(fission or fusion) or by spontaneous radioactivity. 
Nuclear Fuel Basis chain-reacting material, including both 
fissile and fertile materials. Commonly used nuclear fuels 
are natural uranium and low-enriched uranium; high-enriched 
uranium and plutonium are used in some reactors. 
Nuclear Fuel Cycle The set of chemical and physical 
operations needed to prepare nuclear materials for use in 
reactors and to dispose of or recycle the material after its 
removal from the reactor. Existing cycles begin with 
uranium as a natural resource and create plutonium as a 
by-product. 
Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Plant A facility where the nuclear 
material (e.g., enriched or natural uranium) is fabricated 
in fuel elements to be inserted into a reactor. 
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Nuclear Reactor A mechanism fuel by fissionable materials 
that give off neutrons, thereby inducing heat. Reactors are 
of three general types: power, production and research. 
Nuclear Waste The radioactive by-products formed by fission 
and other nuclear processes in a reactor. 
Nuclear Weapons A collective term for atomic and hydrogen 
bombs. Weapons based on a nuclear explosion. 
Plutonium-239 A fissile isotope occurring naturally in only 
minute quanti ties, which is manufactured artificially when 
uranium-238, through irradiation, captures and extra 
neutron. It is one of two materials that have been used for 
the core of nuclear weapons, the other being highly enriched 
uranium. 
Plutonium-240 A fissile isotope produced in reactors when a 
plutonium-239 atom absorbs a neutron instead of fissioning. 
Its presence complicates the construction of nuclear 
explosives because of a high rate of spontaneous fission. 
Power Reactor A reactor designed to produce electricity. 
Production Reactor A reactor designed 
large-scale production of plutonium-239 
irradiation of uranium-238. 
primarily for 
by neutron 
Reprocessing Chemical treatment of spent reactor fuel to 
separate the plutonium and uranium from the unwanted 
radioactive waste by-products and (under present plans) from 
each other. 
Research Reactor A reactor primarily designed to supply 
neutrons for experimental purposes. 
Spent Fuel Fuel element that have been removed from the 
reactor because they contain too little fissile and fertile 
material and too high a concentration of unwanted 
radioactive by-products to sustain reactor operations. 
Spent for is both thermally and radioactively hot. 
Thorium-232 A fertile material. 
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Tritium the heaviest hydrogen isotope, containing one 
proton and two neutrons in the nucleus. In a fission 
weapon, tritium produces excess neutrons, which set off 
additional reactions in the weapons fissile material. In 
this way tritium can either reduce the required fissile 
material, or multiply (i.e., boost) the weapon's destructive 
power as much as five times. In fusion reactions, tritium 
and deuterium, another hydrogen isotope, bond tat very high 
temperatures, releasing approximately 14 million electron-
volts of energy per set of neutrons. 
Ultracentrifuge A rotating vessel that can be used for the 
enrichment of uranium. The heavier isotopes of uranium 
hexafluoride gas concentrate at the walls of the rotating 
centrifuge and are drawn off. 
Uranium A radioactive element with the atomic number 92 
and, as found in ores, an average atomic weight of 238. The 
two principal natural isotopes are uranium-235 (0.7 percent 
of natural uranium), which is fissionable, and uranium-238 
(99.3 percent of natural uranium), which is fertile. 
Uranium-233 (U233 ) A fissionable isotope bred in 
thorium-232. Theoretically an excellent material for 
nuclear weapons, but is not known to have been used for that 
purpose. Can be used as reactor fuel. 
Uranium-235 (U235 ) The only naturally occurring fissionable 
isotope. Natural uranium contains 0.7 percent; light-water 
reactors use about 3 percent and weapons grade, highly 
enriched uranium normally consists of 93 percent of this 
isotope. 
Uranium-238 (U238 ) A fertile material. Natural uranium is 
composed of approximately 99.3 percent of this isotope. 
Uranium Dioxide (U02 ) Purified uranium. The form of 
natural uranium used in heavy water reactors. Produced as a 
powder, uranium dioxide is, in turn, fabricated into fuel 
elements. 
Uranium Oxide (U30 8 ) The most common oxide of uranium found 
in ores. U30 8 is extracted form the ore during the milling 
process. The ore typically contains only 0.1 percent; 
yellowcake, the product of the milling process, contains 
about 8 0 percent u,o[J. 
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Uranium Hexafluoride (UF6 ) A volatile compound of uranium 
and fluorine. UF6 is a solid at atmospheric pressure and 
room temperature, but can be transformed into a gas by 
heating. UF6 gas is the feed stock in all uranium 
enrichment processes and is sometimes produced as an 
intermediate product in the purification of yellowcake to 
produce uranium oxide. 
Weapons Grade Nuclear material of the type most sui table 
for nuclear weapons, i.e., uranium enriched to 93 percent 
U235 or plutonium that is primarily P239 • 
Weapons-Usable Fissionable material that is weapons-grade 
or, though less than ideal for weapons, can still be used to 
make a nuclear explosive. 
Yellowcake A concentrate produced during the milling 
process that contains about 80 percent uranium oxide. In 
preparation for uranium enrichment, the yellowcake is 
converted to uranium hexafluoride gas. In the preparation 
of natural uranium reactor fuel, yellowcake is processed 
into purified uranium dioxide. 
Yield The total energy released in a nuclear explosion. It 
is usually expressed in equivalent tons of TNT. 
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